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Abstract 
The concept of attention has been used in many senses, often without clarifying how or 
why attention works as it does. Attention, like consciousness, is often described in a 
disembodied way. The present article summarizes neural models and supportive data 
about how attention is linked to processes of learning, expectation, competition, and 
consciousness. A key theme is that attention modulates cortical self-organization and 
stability. Perceptual and cognitive neocortex is organized into six main cell layers, with 
characteristic sub-lamina. Attention is part of a unified design of bottom-up, horizontal, 
and top-down interactions among identified cells in laminar cortical circuits. Neural 
models clarify how attention may allocated during processes of visual perception, 
learning and search; auditory streaming and speech perception; movement target 
selection during sensory-motor control; mental imagery and fantasy; and hallucinations 
during mental disorders, among other processes. 
Introduction 
Attention is a behavioral concept, but one whose properties arise from brain mechanisms. 
To fully understand how attention works, one needs to mechanistically link brain 
mechanisms to the attentive behavioral functions that they control. Building brain-
behavior links for processes of attention is particularly challenging, since attention is 
typically a modulatory process that can sensitize, or prime, an observer to expect an 
object to occur at a given location, or with particular stimulus properties (Posner, 1980; 
Duncan, 1984). Were attention, by itself, able to routinely activate fully formed 
perceptual representations, then we could not tell the difference between external reality 
and internal fantasy or hallucination. Thus, to fully understand attention, we need to 
explain the brain processes that attention is modulating. A rapidly growing number of 
models can now quantitatively simulate the neurophysiologically recorded dynamics of 
identified nerve cells in known anatomies and the behaviors that they control, and these 
models naturally include attentional processes. 
This article emphasizes models and data about how attention is realized within the 
laminar circuits of neocortex. Neural system models have also clarified how attention 
may be allocated during many different tasks, as summarized below. 
Linking Attention to Learning, Expectation, Competition, Synchronization, 
and Consciousness 
Neural models of perception and cognition have predicted that top-down attention is a 
key mechanism for solving the stability-plasticity dilenuna (Grossberg, I 980, 1999b ), 
which concerns the fact that brains can rapidly learn enormous amounts of information 
throughout life, without just as rapidly forgetting what they already know. How do 
attentive processes within neocortex help to stabilize cortical learning and memory 
through time, so that they are not catastrophically overwritten by the new stimuli with 
which they are continually bombarded? 
Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, proposes how attention helps to solves the 
stability-plasticity dilemma by modeling how bottom-up signals activate top-down 
expectations whose signals are matched against bottom-up data. Both the bottom-up and 
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top-down pathways contain adaptive weights, or long-term memory traces, that may be 
modified by experience (Figure Ia). The learned top-down expectations "focus attention" 
upon information that matches them (Figure !b). They select, synchronize, and amplify 
the activities of cells within the attentional focus, while suppressing the activities of 
irrelevant cells, which could otherwise be incorporated into previously learned memories 
and thereby destabilize them. The cell activities which survive such top-down attentional 
focusing rapidly reactivate bottom-up pathways (Figure Ia), thereby generating a 
feedback resonance between bottom-up and top-down signal exchanges. Such resonances 
rapidly bind distributed information at multiple levels of brain processing into context-
sensitive representations of objects and events. These resonances are proposed to support 
slower processes of learning; hence the name adaptive resonance. ART also predicts that 
"All conscious states are resonant states." Thus, ART links attention to processes of 
learning, expectation, competition, synchronization, and consciousness. 
Figure I 
Since these predictions were made in the 1970's, many experimental and modeling 
studies have provided support for them. Some relevant experiments are summarized 
below. Other chapters in this volume provide additional supportive evidence; e.g., Bar, 
Chelazzi, Fries, Humphreys, Kastner, Koch, Martinez-Trujillo, Munoz, O'Cravcn, Rezec, 
Reisenhuber, Sillito, Singer, and Steinmetz. 
Mathematical analyses have proved how easily learning can lead to catastrophic 
forgetting in response to a changing world, and how top-down attention can stabilize 
learning if it satisfies four properties (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991 ), which together are 
called the ART Matching Rule: 
Bottom-Up Automatic Activation: A cell, or cell population, can become active 
enough to generate output signals if it receives a large enough bottom-up input, other 
things being equal. Such an input can drive the cell to suprathresholcllevels of activation. 
Top-Down Priming: A cell cannot fire if it receives only a large top-clown 
expectation input. Such a top-down signal can modulate, prime, or sensitize, the cell, and 
thereby prepare it to react more quickly and vigorously to subsequent bottom-up inputs 
that approximately match the top-down expectation. A top-down signal can also shift the 
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baseline firing rate of the cell. It cannot, however, generate large behaviorally significant 
output signals from the cell. 
Match: A cell can fire if it receives large convergent bottom-up and top-down 
inputs. Such a matching process can generate enhanced and synchronized cell activation 
as resonance takes hold. 
Mismatch: Cell activity is suppressed, even if the cell receives a large bottom-up 
input, if it also receives only a small, or zero, top-down expectation input. 
The simplest mathematically possible circuit (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991), a 
lop-down modulatory on-center off-surround network (Figure 1), has successfully been 
used to simulate a variety of behavioral and brain data (Grossberg, 1999b). In such a 
circuit, when only bottom-up signals are active, all cells can fire that receive large enough 
inputs. When only top-down attention is active, cells in the off-surround that receive 
inhibition but no excitation can get strongly inhibited, while cells in the on-center that 
receive a combination of excitation and inhibition can get at most subliminally activated 
due to an approximate balance between excitation and inhibition. When bottom-up and 
top-down inputs match (pathway 2 in Figure !C), the two excitatory sources of excitation 
(bottom-up and top-down) that converge at the cell can overwhelm the one inhibitory 
source; it is a case of "two-against-one" that can lead to synchronous firing. When 
bottom-up and top-down inputs mismatch (pathway 1 in Figure 1 C), the lop-down 
inhibition can neutralize the bottom-up excitation; it is a case of "one-against-one." 
Attention is Modulatory 
The ART Matching Rule predicted that top-down attention accomplishes modulatory 
priming and matching by using competitive mechanisms like the top-down modulatory 
on-center off-surround network in Figure I c. Data compatible with this prediction were 
gradually reported over the years, with an acceleration of experiments during the past five 
years. For example, Zeki and Shipp (Zeki and Shipp, 1988, p. 316) wrote that "backward 
connections seem not to excite cells in lower areas, but instead influence the way they 
respond to stimuli". Likewise, the data of Sillito, et al. (1994, pp. 479-482) on attenlional 
feedback from VI to LON led them to conclude that "the cortico-thalamic input is only 
strong enough lo exert an effect on those dLGN cells that are additionally polarized by 
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their retinal input... the feedback circuit searches for correlations that support the 
'hypothesis' represented by a particular pattern of cortical activity". Their experiments 
demonstrated all of the properties of the ART Matching Rule, since they found in 
addition that "cortically induced conelation of relay cell activity produces coherent firing 
in those groups of relay cells with receptive-field alignments appropriate to signal the 
particular orientation of the moving contour to the cortex ... this increases the gain of the 
input for feature-linked events detected by the cortex". In other words, top-down 
signaling, by itself, cannot fully activate LGN cells; it needs matched bottom-up retinal 
inputs to do so, and those LGN cells whose bottom-up signals support cortical activity 
may get synchronized and amplified by this feedback. In addition, anatomical studies 
have shown that the top-down V 1 to LGN pathway realizes a top-down on-center off-
surround network (Dubin and Cleland, 1977; Weber, Kalil, and Behan, 1989); see Figure 
2d. 
Laminar Organization of Bottom-Up, Horizontal, and Top-Down Connections 
How are top-down attentional circuits realized within the brain, in particular within 
perceptual and cognitive neocortex? All sensory and cognitive neocortex is organized 
into six main layers of cells. A recent family of LAM IN ART models (Figure 2) proposes 
a detailed answer to this question for the interblob stream of visual cortex, and by 
extension to other neocortical areas, by characterizing how bottom-up, top-clown, ami 
horizontal interactions are organized within cortical layers to generate percepts of visual 
form. In particular, LAMINART shows how these interactions help visual cortex to 
realize: (1) stable development and learning of circuit connections and weights in 
response to a changing environment; (2) coherent grouping or binding of distributed 
information into boundary representations of objects and events without a loss of analog 
sensitivity-the property of analog coherence; and (3) attentional focusing on important 
object representations at the expense of less important representations (Grossberg, 1999a; 
Grossberg, Mingolla, and Ross, 1997; Grossberg and Raizacla, 2000; Grossberg and 
Seitz, 2003; Grossberg and Williamson, 2001; Raizacla and Grossberg, 2001). Three 
important implications of this result are as follows: 
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Figure 2 
First, biological vision systems are not merely bottom-up filtering devices, as Hubel and 
Wiesel proposed in their classical analysis of early vision. Rather, even early stages of 
visual cortex join together bottom-up filtering, horizontal grouping, and top-down 
attention. Perceptual grouping, the process that binds spatially distributed and incomplete 
information into 3D object representations, starts at an early cortical stage; see Figure 2c. 
These grouping interactions are often cited as the basis of "non-classical" receptive fields 
that are sensitive to the context in which individual features are found (Bosking, et al., 
!997; Grosof, Shapley, and Hawken, 1993; Kapadia, et al., 1995; Knierim and van Essen, 
!992; Peterhans and von cler Heydt, 1989; Polat, el al., 1998; Sheth, el al., 1996; von cler 
Heydt, Peterhans, and Baumgartner, 1984; Sillito, et al., 1995). 
Second, even early visual processing is modulated by system goals via top-down 
expectations and attention (Motter, 1993; Roelfsema, Lamme, and Spekreijse, 1998; 
Sillito, et al., 1994; Somers, et al., 1999; Watanabe, et al., 1998). In particular, Figure 2b 
illustrates how layer 6 of a higher cortical area can modulate layer 4 of a lower cortical 
area via a top-clown on-center off-surround circuit. It can do so, for example, by 
activating apical dendrites in layer I of layer 5 cells, which activate layer 6 cells. Layer 6 
cells, in turn, can activate layer 4 through a modulatory on-center off-surround network. 
Such a circuit exemplifiesf!Jided.fi!edback (Grossberg, !999a); namely, top-clown signals 
are "folded" back into the feeclforwarcl flow of visual information processing. The 6-to-4 
network is thus predicted to be an interface, called the preattentive-allentive imerfclce, 
where data-driven bottom-up pre-attentive processing and task-directed top-clown 
attentive processing are fused together via a shared decision circuit. 
This layer 6-to-4 modulatory decision circuit realizes at least three functional 
roles in the model: contrast normalization of bottom-up inputs from earlier processing 
levels (Figure 2a); selection of winning groupings that start to form in layer 2/3 via 
horizontal connections, while preserving their analog coherence in response to 
intracortical feedback (Figure 2c); and attentional priming in response to intercortical 
feedback from a higher cortical level (Figure 2b). In particular, attention shares the same 
decision circuit as pre-attentive filtering and grouping, which is how attention can do its 
work. Attention can also directly modulate layer 2/3 groupings by activating the dendrites 
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in layer 1 of excitatory and inhibitory cells in layer 2/3 (Lund and Wu, 1997; Rockland, 
and Virga, 1989). A balance between excitation and inhibition has been predicted to be a 
basic design principle in perceptual grouping (Grossberg, 1999a; Grossberg and Raizada, 
2000). By activating both excitatory and inhibitory cells in layer 2/3, inhibitory 
interneurons that synapse on excitatory cells may balance their activation, thereby 
enabling attention to directly modulate the responses of grouping cells in layer 2/3. 
Third, mechanisms governing (I) in the infant lead to properties (2) and (3) in the 
adult. Thus, mechanisms that enable the cortex to learn in a stable way define key 
properties of adult visual information processing. This last result shows that learning and 
information processing need to be co-designed for either to work well in a novel 
environment. 
Attention, Competition, and Matching 
Both ART and LAMINAR 'I' predict that attention from higher cortical areas, such as area 
V2, acts on cells in area V1 via a top-clown modulatory on-center off-surround network. 
Experiments of Hupe et al. (1997, p. 1031) support this prediction by showing that 
"feedback connections from area V2 modulate but do not create center-surround 
interactions in VI neurons." More generally, the prediction that top-down attention has 
an on-center off-surround characteristic has received a considerable amount of 
psychological and neurobiological empirical confirmation in the visual system (Bullier, et 
al., 1996; Caputo and Guerra, 1998; Downing, 1988; Mounts, 2000; Reynolds, Chelazzi, 
and Desimone, 1999; Smith, Singh, and Greenlee, 2000; Somers, et al., 1999; Sillito, et 
al., 1994; Steinman, Steinman, and Lehmkuhle, 1995; Vanduffell, Tootell, and Orban, 
2000). In particular, the claim that bottom-up sensory activity is enhanced when matched 
by top-down on-center signals is in accord with an extensive neurophysiological 
literature showing the facilitatory effect of attentional feedback (Luck, et al., 1997; 
Roelfsema, et al., 1998; Sillito, et al., 1994), but not with models in which matches with 
top-down feedback cause suppression (Mumford, 1992; Rao and Ballard, 1999). ART 
predicts that on-center off-surround attentional feedback should exist in all sensory and 
cognitive systems that are capable of stable on-line learning. In particular, feedback from 
auditory cortex to the medial geniculate nucleus (MGN) and the inferior colliculus (!C) 
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also has an on-center off-surround form (Zhang, Suga, and Yan, 1997) as does feedback 
in the rodent barrel system (Temereanca and Simons, 200 1). 
Top-down attention through competitive matching has also been used to explain 
data about 3D figure-ground separation (Kelly and Grossberg, 2000), visual object 
learning and recognition (Bradski and Grossberg, 1995; Carpenter and Ross, 1995; 
Grossberg, 1999b), visual search (Grossberg, Mingolla, and Ross, 1994), visual motion 
perception (Chey, Grossberg, and Mingolla, 1997; Grossberg, Mingolla, and 
Viswanathan, 2001), auditory streaming (Grossberg, 1999b), speech perception and word 
recognition (Grossberg, Boardman, and Cohen, 1997; Grossberg and Myers, 2000; 
Grossberg and Stone, 1986), selection of eye movement targets (Grossberg, et al., 1997), 
and imagery, fantasy, and hallucinations (Grossberg, 2000). 
The ART prediction that attention is mediated through competitive mechanisms 
has recently been restated in terms of the concept of "biased competition" (Desimone, 
1998; see Kastner, this volume), in which attention biases the competitive influences 
within the network. Figure 3 summarizes data of Reynolds, Chelazzi, and Desimone 
(1999) and a simulation of these data from Grossberg and Raizada (2000) that illustrate 
the on-center off-surround character of attention in macaque V2. 
Figure 3 
Object-Based Attention via the Preattentive-Attentive Interface 
When images that contain unambiguous groupings are processed, the laminar circuit in 
Figure 2e can react quickly with a fast fcedforward sweep of activation through layers 4-
to-2/3 in one cortical area then to 4-to-2/3 in a higher cortical area, and so on (Thorpe, 
Fizc, and Marlo!, 1996; also sec Thorpe, this volume). When ambiguous and complex 
scenes arc being processed, competitive interactions in layers 4 and 2/3 are predicted to 
attenuate amplitude and processing rate of cell activation in layer 2/3. Intracortical 
feedback from layer 2/3-to-6-to-4-to-2/3 enables stronger groupings in layer 2/3 to be 
contrast-enhanced while they quickly inhibit weaker groupings, and then to fire 
vigorously to higher cortical levels. 
Because the cortex uses the same circuits to select groupings (Figure 2c), and to 
prime attention (Figure 2b), attention can selectively focus on an entire object by flowing 
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along the perceptual groupings that define the object boundary (Roelfsema, Lamme, and 
Spekreijse, 1998; Figure 4a). In particular, when attention causes an excitatory 
modulatory bias at some cells in layer 4, groupings that form in layer 2/3 can be 
enhanced by this modulation via their positive feedback loops from 2/3-to-6-to-4-to-2/3. 
The direct modulation of layer 2/3 by attention can also enhance these groupings. Figure 
4b summarizes a LAMINART simulation of the Roelfsema, eta!. (1998) data. 
LAMINART also simulates the spread of attention along an illusory contour (Raizada 
and Grossberg, 2001), consistent with experimental data of Moore, Yantis, and Vaughan 
(1998), thereby illustrating how the cortex can attend incomplete object data. 
The ability of attention to selectively light up entire object representations has an 
obviously important survival value. It is thus of interest that the intracortical and 
intercortical feedback circuits that control this property have been shown in modeling 
studies to help stabilize infant development and adult perceptual learning within multiple 
cortical areas, including cortical areas VI and V2 (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991; 
Grossberg, 1999a; I999b; Grossberg and Williamson, 2001). 
Figure 4 
The Link Between Attention and Leaming 
The ART proposal that attention helps to stabilize cortical development and learning, 
thereby preventing catastrophic forgetting, suggests that top-down attentional 
mechanisms should be present in every corlical area wherein these processes occur. The 
ART solution to the stability-plasticity problem is to allow neural representations to be 
modified only by those incoming stimuli with which they form a sufficiently close match. 
If the match is close enough, then resonance and learning occurs. Precisely because the 
match is sufficiently close, such learning fine-tunes the memories of existing 
representations. In this way, outliers cannot cause a radical overwriting of an already 
learned representation. 
ART also proposes how, at higher levels of perceptual and cognitive processing, 
including inferotemporal and prefrontal cortex, a learning individual can flexibly vary the 
criterion of how good a match is needed between bottom-up and top-down information in 
order for presently active recognition categories and their top-down expectations to be 
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refined through learning (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1987; Grossberg, 1999b). This can be 
achieved by a process called vigilance control, which can alter the criterion of how good 
a match is needed for resonance to occur. When coarse matches are allowed, a top-down 
expectation, say from prefrontal to inferotemporal cortex, can learn a prototype that is 
capable of focusing attention upon general and abstract information. When only fine 
matches are allowed, learned prototypes are more specific and concrete, and can focus 
attention even upon individual exemplars, such as particular views of particular faces 
(Desimone and Ungerleider, 1989; Gochin, et al., 1991; Harries and Perrett, 1991). 
If the active top-down prototype does not match well enough with the bottom-up 
input, then its neural activity is extinguished and hence unable to cause plastic changes. 
Suppression of an active representation enables a memory search to ensue whereby a 
different representation can become active instead through bottom-up signaling. This 
representation, in turn, reads out top-down signals that either gives rise to a match, 
thereby allowing learning, or a non-match, causing the search process to repeat until 
either a match is found or the incoming stimulus causes a totally new representation to be 
formed. ART proposes how such a memory search can be mediated by cortico-
hippocampal interactions (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991, 1993; Grossberg and Merrill, 
1996). 
This summary of ART-based recognition learning shows how the focus of object 
attention may become either abstract or concrete, depending upon the task-constraints 
that are imposed. Compatible data from recordings in inferotemporal cortex were 
reported by Spitzer, Desimone, and Moran (1988) who exposed monkeys to easy and 
difficult discriminations, and showed "in the difficult condition the animals adopted a 
stricter internal criterion for discriminating matching from nonmatching stimuli ... the 
animals' internal representations of the stimuli were better separated, independent of the 
criterion used to discriminate them ... increased effort appears to cause enhancement of 
the responses and sharpened selectivity for attended stimuli" (pp. 339-340). 
Other experiments have also supported the predicted link between attention and 
learning. Psychophysically, the role of attention in controlling adult plasticity and 
perceptual learning was demonstrated by Ahissar and Hochstein (1993). Gao and Suga 
(1998) reported physiological evidence that acoustic stimuli caused plastic changes in the 
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inferior colliculus (IC) of bats only when the IC received top-down feedback from 
auditory cortex. These authors also reported that plasticity is enhanced when the auditory 
stimuli were made behaviorally relevant, consistent with the ART proposal that top-down 
feedback allows attended, and thus relevant, stimuli to be learned, while suppressing 
unattended irrelevant ones. Evidence that cortical feedback also controls thalamic 
plasticity in the somatosensory system has been found by Krupa, Ghazanfar, and 
Nicolelis (1999) and by Parker and Dostrovsky (1999). These findings are reviewed by 
Kaas (1999). 
Studies of intercortical attention-activated feedback and intracortical grouping-
activated feedback have also shown that either type of feedback can rapidly synchronize 
the firing patterns of higher and lower cortical areas (Grossberg and Grunewald, 1997; 
Grossberg and Somers, 1991). ART puts this result into perspective by suggesting that 
resonance may lead to synchronization, which may facilitate cortical learning by 
enhancing the probability that "cells that fire together wire together." Engel, Fries, and 
Singer (2001) review data about top-down cortical feedback and synchrony; also sec 
Singer, this volume. The cortex also includes circuits that enable development and 
learning to self-stabilize without top-down intercortical attention by using the 
intracortical pathway from layer 2/3-to-6-to-4-to-2/3 (see Figure 2c) to act as a selection 
circuit that inhibits outliers before they can cause catastrophic forgetting; see Raizada and 
Grossberg (2003) for further discussion. 
Divided, Object vs. Spatial, and Hierarchical Attention 
Although bottom-up inputs which arrive in the off-surround of an active top-down 
attentional prime may be suppressed, inputs outside the off-surround may not be 
suppressed. This is already clear in some conditions of the Reynolds, Chelazzi, and 
Desimone (1999) experiment that is summarized in Figure 3. In fact, many studies have 
shown that attention may be simultaneously divided among several targets (e.g., 
Pylyshyn and Storm, 1988; Yantis, 1992). In addition, both object and spatial attention 
may influence visual perception (Duncan, 1984; Posner, 1980). The distinction between 
object and spatial attention reflects the organization of visual cortex into parallel What 
and Where processing streams. Many cognitive neuroscience experiments support the 
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hypotheses of Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982) and of Goodale and Milner (1992) that 
inferotemporal cortex and its cortical projections learn to categorize and recognize what 
objects are in the world, whereas parietal cortex and its cortical projections learn to 
determine where they are in space and how to act with respect to them. Because the What 
stream strives to generate invariant object representations that are independent of spatial 
coordinates, whereas the Where stream generates representations of object location, these 
streams must interact to control actions aimed at recognized objects. Indeed, both object 
and spatial attention are needed to search for visual targets amid distractors. Grossberg, 
Mingolla, and Ross (1994) quantitatively fit a a large human psychophysical database 
about visual search with a Spatial Object Search (SOS) model that proposes how 3D 
boundary groupings and surface representations interact with object attention and spatial 
attention to find targets amid distractors. In this analysis, object and spatial attention must 
be sensitive to perceptual groupings as well as to surface properties like all occurrences 
of a color on a prescribed depth plane (Grossberg, 1994). 
The present article focuses on the micro-architecture of attention but is consistent 
with, and clarifies, how attention may be globally organized across many brain regions 
acting together. ln particular, laminar cortical circuits (Figure 2e) clarify how attention 
can leap between brain regions via their layers 6, and thereby modulate cells in multiple 
cortical layers without firing them. 
II 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. (a) Patterns of activation, or short-term memory (STM), on a lower processing 
level send bottom-up signals to a higher processing level. These signals are multiplied by 
adaptive weights, or learned long-term memory (LTM) traces, which influence the 
activation of the cells at the higher processing level. These latter cells, in turn, activate 
top-town expectation signals that are also multiplied by learned LTM traces. These top-
down expectations are matched against the STM pattern that is active at the lower level. 
(b) This matching processes confirms, amplifies, and synchronizes STM activations that 
are supported by large LTM traces in an active top-down expectation, and suppresses 
STM activations that do not get top-down support, thereby focusing attention on the 
representations encoded by the selected cells. The size of the hemidisks at the end of the 
top-down pathways represents the strength of the learned LTM trace that is stored in that 
pathway. (c) The ART Matching Rule may be realized by a top-down modulatory on-
center off-surround network, as discussed in the text. (Reprinted with permission from 
Grossberg, 1999a). 
Figure 2. How known cortical connections join layer 6 -7 4 and layer 2/3 circuits to form 
a laminar V1 and V2 model. Inhibitory interneurons arc shown filled-in black. (a) The 
LGN provides bottom-up activation to layer 4 via two routes. First, it makes a strong 
connection directly into layer 4. Second, LGN axons send collaterals into layer 6, and 
thereby also activate layer 4 via the 6 -7 4 on-center off-surround path. The combined 
effect of the bottom-up LGN pathways is to stimulate layer 4 via an on-center off-
surround, which provides divisive contrast normalization (Grossberg, 1980; Heeger, 
1992) of layer 4 cell responses. (b) Folded feedback carries attentional signals from 
higher cortex into layer 4 of V1, via the modulatory 6 -7 4 path. Corticocortical feedback 
axons tend preferentially to originate in layer 6 of the higher area and to terminate in 
layer 1 of the lower cortex, where they can excite the apical dendrites of layer 5 
pyramidal cells whose axons send collaterals into layer 6. The triangle in the figure 
represents such a layer 5 pyramidal cell. Several other routes through which feedback can 
pass into V1 layer 6 exist. Having arrived in layer 6, the feedback is then "folded" back 
up into the feedforward stream by passing through the 6 -7 4 on-center off-surround path. 
(c) Connecting the 6 --7 4 on-center off-surround to the layer 2/3 grouping circuit: like-
oriented layer 4 simple cells with opposite contrast polarities compete (not shown) before 
generating half-wave rectified outputs that converge onto layer 2/3 complex cells in the 
column above them. Just like attentional signals from higher cortex, as shown in (b), 
groupings that form within layer 2/3 also send activation into the folded feedback path, to 
enhance their own positions in layer 4 beneath them via the 6 --7 4 on-center, and to 
suppress input to other groupings via the 6 --7 4 off-surround. There exist direct layer 2/3 
--7 6 connections in macaque VI, as well as indirect routes via layer 5. (d) Top-down 
corticogeniculate feedback from VI layer 6 to LON also has an on-center off-surround 
anatomy, similar to the 6 --7 4 path. The on-center feedback selectively enhances LON 
cells that are consistent with the activation that they cause, and the off-surround 
contributes to length-sensitive (endstopped) responses that facilitate grouping 
perpendicular to line ends. (e) The entire V IIV2 circuit: V2 repeats the laminar pattern of 
VI circuitry, hut at a larger spatial scale. In particular, the horizontal layer 2/3 
connections have a longer range in V2, allowing above-threshold perceptual groupings 
between more widely spaced inducing stimuli to form. Vllayer 2/3 projects up to V2 
layers 6 and 4, just as LON projects to layers 6 an 4 of VI. Higher cortical areas send 
feedback into V2 which ultimately reaches layer 6, just as V2 feedback acts on layer 6 of 
Vl (Sandell and Schiller, I982). Feedback paths from higher cortical areas struight into 
VI (not shown) can complement and cnhunce feedback from V2 into Vl. Top-down 
attention can also modulate layer 2/3 pyramidal cells directly by activating both the 
pyramidal cells and inhibitory interneurons in that layer. The inhibition tends to balance 
the excitation, lending to a modulatory effect. These top-down attcntional pathways tend 
to synapse in layer 1, as shown in Figure 2b. Their synapses on apical dendrites in layer 1 
are not shown, for simplicity. (Reprinted with permission from Raizada and Grossberg 
(200I), where supportive data references arc cited). 
Figure 3. The effect of attention on competition between visual stimuli. A target 
stimulus, presented on its own (a), elicits strong neural activity at the recorded cell. When 
u second, distractor stimulus is presented nearby (b), it competes against the target, and 
activity is reduced. Directing spatial attention to the location of the target stimulus (c), 
protects the target from this competition, and restores neural activity to the levels elicited 
by the target on its own. The stimuli shown here, based on those used in the 
neurophysiological experiments of Reynolds et al. (1999), were presented to the model 
neural network. Spatial attention (c), was implemented as a Gaussian of activity fed back 
into layer 6. (d) Neurophysiological data from macaque V2 that illustrate the recorded 
activity patterns described above: strong responses to an isolated target (dotted line), 
weaker responses when a competing distractor is placed nearby (dashed line) and restored 
levels of activity when the target is attended (solid line). (Adapted with permission from 
Reynolds et al. (1999, Fig. 5).) (e) Model simulation of the Reynolds et al. data. The 
time-courses illustrated show the activity of a vertically oriented cell stimulated by the 
target bar. If only the horizontal distractor bar were presented on its own, this cell would 
respond very weakly. If both target and dis tractor were presented, but with the horizontal 
distractor attended, the cell would respond, but more weakly than the illustrated case 
where the dis tractor and target are presented together, with neither attended. (Reprinted 
with permission from Grossberg and Raizada (2000)). 
Figure 4. Spread of visual attention along an object boundary grouping, from an 
experiment by Roelfsema et al. (1998). (a) The experimental paradigm. Macaque 
monkeys performed a curve-tracing task, during which physiological recordings were 
made in VI. A fixation spot was presented for 300 ms, followed by a target curve and a 
dis tractor curve presented simultaneously. The target was connected at one end to the 
fixation point. While maintaining fixation, the monkeys had to trace the target curve, 
then, after 600 ms, make a saccade to its endpoint. (b) Neurophysiological data showing 
attentional enhancement of the firing of a neuron when its receptive field (RF) lay on the 
target curve, as opposed to the distractor. Note that the enhancement occurs about 200 ms 
after the initial burst of activity. Further studies have indicated that the enhancement 
starts later in distal curve segments, far from the fixation point, than it does in proximal 
segments, closer to fixation (Pieter Roelfsema, personal communication). This suggests 
that attentional signals propagate along the length of the target curve. (Figures (a) and (b) 
adapted with permission from Roelfsema et al. (1998).) (c) Model simulation of the 
Roelfsema et al. data. (Reprinted with permission from Grossberg and Raizada (2000)). 
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